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The Innocent Landowner Defense
Under CERCLA Should Be
Transferable to Subsequent Purchasers
JAMES W. SPERTUS*
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)1 and the accompa-
nying Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA) 1 (collectively the "Act"), landowners are held strictly li-
able for cleaning up hazardous substances on their property. Pur-
chasers who acquire title to contaminated property become liable
for cleanup costs simply by virtue of their status as the current
owner.' Although liability under the Act is strict, joint, and sev-
eral, a few limited defenses enable some landowners to avoid lia-
bility altogether. One such defense, known as the innocent land-
owner defense,3 is the subject of this article.
In order to qualify as an innocent landowner, a purchaser
who acquires title to contaminated property must prove that he or
she had no reason to know that the property was contaminated at
the time it was acquired." Although it is not easy for an innocent
landowner to prove "lack of knowledge," Congress has determined
that a landowner who satisfies this burden is not responsible for
cleanup costs. However, a landowner who cannot meet this bur-
* Associate, Irell & Manella, Los Angeles, Ca.; J.D., 1991, University of Southern
California; B.A., 1988, University of California at Los Angeles.
CERCLA §§ 101-75, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
SARA amends, clarifies, and reauthorizes the CERCLA statutes. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75.
2 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding current owner liable for response costs even though current owner did not own site
at time of disposal); United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(holding the owner of a farm on which hazardous substances were disposed liable for the
response costs under CERCLA § 107(a)); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding the current owner definitely liable for the
response costs under CERCLA § 107(a)).
3 The innocent landowner defense is codified under CERCLA 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
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den, including one who acquires title to contaminated property
with actual knowledge of the contamination, is held strictly liable
under the Act for the costs of cleanup whether or not the owner
had a role in contaminating the property.'
This article argues that there should be no lack-of-knowledge
prerequisite to the innocent landowner defense under the Act be-
cause this prerequisite does not further the goals of the Act and
penalizes those landowners who Congress has sought to relieve
from liability. Sellers have a legal duty to disclose their knowledge
of material facts concerning their property to subsequent purchas-
ers.' Contamination of property will always be a material fact of
interest to a subsequent purchaser. When combined with the lack-
of-knowledge prerequisite to the innocent landowner defense, the
duty of disclosure precludes innocent landowners from transfer-
ring their innocent landowner status to subsequent purchasers.
Because subsequent purchasers who knowingly acquire title
to contaminated property cannot qualify as innocent landowners,
there is virtually no market for contaminated property in today's
economy. As a result, supposedly innocent landowners are de-
prived of much of the benefit of their defense, and society is de-
prived of potentially faster pollution remediation as well as poten-
tially more efficient land use. There is no good reason to deny the
innocent landowner defense to subsequent purchasers who acquire
title to contaminated property with knowledge of the contamina-
tion. Such purchasers, if afforded innocent landowner status, will
put contaminated property to higher and better uses, and will po-
tentially facilitate faster and more complete cleanup efforts.
I If the landowner does not clean up the property, the government or another poten-
tially responsible party under the Act will probably clean it up and sue the landowner for
contribution.
I Certain states, such as California, have adopted disclosure statutes that require
landowners to complete a special form when transferring title to their property. See, e.g.,
CAL CI. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994)(requiring detailed disclosures of
many different types of information). However, even in states that do not have such disclos-
ure laws, landowners with knowledge of contamination on their property who do not dis-
close this information to subsequent purchasers can still be held liable for negligent or
intentional misrepresentation under common law principles.
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I. THE LACK-OF-KNOWLEDGE PREREQUISITE TO THE INNOCENT
LANDOWNER DEFENSE PRECLUDES SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS
FROM QUALIFYING AS INNOCENT LANDOWNERS
The following two sections of the Act combine to create the
lack-of-knowledge prerequisite to the innocent landowner defense:
(1) section 9607(b)(3), which was part of the original CERCLA
legislation, and (2) section 9601(35), which was adopted with
SARA. Section 9607(b)(3) denies the innocent landowner defense
to those who stand in a contractual relationship with a responsible
party, 7 and section 9601(35)(A) defines the term "contractual re-
lationship" to include a purchase and sale agreement."
Even prior to SARA, the courts had interpreted the term
"contractual relationship" to include a purchase and sale agree-
ment." Because title to real property is almost always transferred
by deed pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement, however, vir-
tually all purchasers of contaminated property stood in a contrac-
tual relationships with responsible parties and, therefore, could not
qualify as innocent landowners. However, SARA added language
to section 9601(35) which allows certain landowners to qualify for
the innocent landowner defense despite the fact that they may
stand in a contractual relationship with a responsible party.10 If
one of the three conditions quoted below in Section 9601(35) can
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, then a written in-
CERCLA § 107(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
There shall be no liability .. for a person otherwise liable who can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely
by ... an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
. . . if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, ...
and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party . ...
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
- 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) provides that the term 'contractual relationship' for pur-
poses of § 9607(b)(3) "includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instru-
ments transferring title or possession .... "
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
It is important to note that even when a subsequent purchaser acquires contami-
nated property from an innocent landowner, the subsequent purchaser still stands indirectly
in a contractual relationship with a responsible party so long as a responsible party is in the
chain of title. A purchase and sale agreement can serve as a contractual bridge to liability
that is several transfers removed in the chain of title.
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strument transferring title will not constitute a contractual rela-
tionship for purposes of section 9607(b)(3).
Section 9601(35) provides as follows:
The term "contractual relationship" for the purpose of Section
9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land con-
tracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession,
unless the real property on which the facility concerned is lo-
cated was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or place-
ment of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and
one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or
(iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence: (i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility
the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility. (ii)
The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facil-
ity by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or ac-
quisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority
by purchase or condemnation. (iii) The defendant acquired the
facility by inheritance or bequest. 1'
These classifications provide defenses for very few landowners.
Most subsequent purchasers are not government entities, and
most do not acquire title by inheritance or bequest. Consequently,
conditions (ii) and (iii) are usually not applicable. Condition (i),
which contains the lack-of-knowledge requirement, is therefore
the innocent landowner defense for the majority of qualifying pur-
chasers. For a subsequent purchaser who acquires title to contami-
nated property by executing and performing on a purchase agree-
ment, the entire innocent landowner defense turns on whether that
subsequent purchaser knew or should have known that the ac-
quired property was contaminated. 2 When sellers of contami-
nated property have knowledge of contamination and discharge
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(1988).
12 This inquiry is controlled by CERCLA § 101(35)(B) which provides as follows:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause
(i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have under-
taken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or cus-
tomary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preced-
ing sentence, the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or
experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of
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their legal duty to disclose this information to subsequent purchas-
ers, the subsequent purchasers, by definition, cannot qualify for
the innocent landowner defense. Purchasers who acquire title to
contaminated property with knowledge of the contamination can-
not satisfy the requirements of section 9601(35)(A)(i), quoted
above.
Even if a seller does not discharge his or her legal duty of
disclosure, the subsequent purchaser may still not be able to prove
that he or she had no reason to know that the acquired property
was contaminated. Parties who challenge application of the inno-
cent landowner defense often argue that the current owner failed,
at the time of acquisition, to undertake "all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent
with good commercial or customary practice," as required by sec-
tion 9601(35)(B). For example, in Jersey City Redevelopment
Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc.,t 3 the court held that even if the
innocent landowner defense applied to off-site property, the de-
fendant could not satisfy the requirement that it did not know of
the hazardous waste disposal on the property it had purchased be-
cause the purchaser knew that the site had been used for chro-
mium processing and that residue muds were created. The court
declined to read into CERCLA an intent to afford landowners a
broad lack-of-specific-knowledge defense. Instead, the court un-
derstood the appropriate inquiry to be whether the landowner
knew at the time of purchase that the substance existed on the
property.
This article argues that this lack-of-knowledge requirement
contained in section 9601(35)(A)(i) should be deleted from the
Act. Deleting the lack-of-knowledge requirement will obviate the
need to distinguish actual knowledge from a lack of diligent in-
quiry and will allow innocent landowners to transfer their status
as innocent landowners to subsequent purchasers. Section
9601(35)(A) should be rewritten to provide that the term "con-
tractual relationship" does not include a purchase and sale agree-
ment, deed, or other instrument transferring title. For the reasons
discussed below, subsequent purchasers should be able to qualify
the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(B) (1988).
" Jersey City Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc., 28 Env't Rep. Cas,
(BNA) 1873 (3d Cir. 1988).
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as innocent landowners whether or not they acquire title with
knowledge of the contamination.
II. THERE SHOULD BE No LACK-OF-KNOWLEDGE
PREREQUISITE TO THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE
The 1986 addition of Section 9601(35) outlining the require-
ments for the innocent landowner defense confirms that Congress
did not intend to hold landowners who have nothing to do with
contaminating a particular site responsible for cleaning up con-
taminated property.14 By disallowing the defense to purchasers
who acquire title with knowledge of contamination, however, this
Congressional purpose is frustrated. The lack-of-knowledge pre-
requisite forces these innocent landowners to incur cleanup costs
despite the fact that they can satisfy all of the elements of section
9607(b)(3). A purchaser interested in a parcel who discovers dur-
ing an investigation that the property is contaminated will be una-
ble to acquire the parcel without becoming liable for the costs of
cleaning it up, which means that the seller, the supposedly inno-
cent landowner, holds title to property which has become devalued
by the estimated costs of cleanup. This phenomenon hurts both
innocent landowners and society at large. Innocent landowners are
not relieved of the costs of cleaning up their contaminated prop-
erty, which seems inconsistent with Congress's objectives under
the CERCLA liability scheme, and society is deprived of faster
remediations and more efficient land use.
Assuming that an innocent landowner does not just ignore
contamination or defraud a subsequent purchaser, an innocent
landowner who discovers contamination on his or her property has
two viable options. First, the innocent landowner has a litigation
option. The innocent landowner can either sue the responsible par-
ties, forcing them to clean up the contaminated property, or wait
until the government or other private parties file suit against the
responsible parties. The litigation option, however, is time-con-
suming and expensive. An innocent landowner must have signifi-
cant resources available to file a lawsuit.
" See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (holding that landowners may affirmatively avoid liability if
they can prove that they did not know and had no reason to know that hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of on their land at the time they acquired title or possession and
noting that CERCLA § 101 (35) signaled Congress' intent to impose liability on landown-
ers who could not satisfy the subsection).
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Likewise, waiting for the government or another private party
to file a lawsuit against the responsible parties is also time-con-
suming and expensive. Innocent landowners who elect to take no
offensive action are still forced to incur the costs of defending
themselves against lawsuits filed by other responsible parties. Ad-
ditionally, innocent landowners bear the burden of proving the ele-
ments of their defense in court. In sum, whether the innocent
landowner is the plaintiff or defendant in a civil action, retaining
title to contaminated property is expensive because the current
owner is inescapably involved in the remediation efforts.
The second alternative available to innocent landowners is a
sale-of-property option. An innocent landowner who lacks suffi-
cient resources to pursue a litigation option can attempt to sell the
contaminated property and, upon transferring title, escape the lia-
bility provisions of the Act.15 However, this second option simi-
larly denies the innocent landowner the benefits of the defense.
Because innocent landowners cannot transfer their status to subse-
quent purchasers, innocent landowners who sell contaminated
property become indirectly liable for the entire remediation effort
because the property must be devalued, at a minimum, by the es-
timated cleanup costs.
Innocent landowners who elect to sell their contaminated
property must discount the purchase price by an amount sufficient
to compensate the subsequent purchaser for the estimated costs of
cleanup. When the subsequent purchaser acquires title to the con-
taminated property with knowledge of the contamination, the pur-
chaser becomes jointly and severally liable for the entire costs of
cleanup despite the fact that the acquisition postdates the contam-
ination. Consequently, a purchaser must add the estimated
cleanup costs to the purchase price to determine the true cost of
the property.
1 CERCLA places liability for cleanup costs on three different groups: (1) individuals
who owned the property at the time the property was contaminated; (2) individuals who
accepted the hazardous waste for disposal, transport or treatment; and (3) the current
owners. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1988). The only theory upon which an
innocent landowner can be held liable, absent the defense, is under category three, as a
current owner of a contaminated site. Consequently, if such an owner transfers title and
thereby drops out of category three, there is no theory by which the now former owner can
be held liable. The former owner no longer faces liability under the Act, assuming, of
course, that the owner did not exacerbate the contamination during the period of
ownership.
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Additionally, the subsequent purchaser will charge the inno-
cent landowner a premium to compensate for the risk that the
actual cleanup costs might exceed the estimated cleanup costs.
After acquiring title, the purchaser will not be able to rescind the
sale if he or she discovers that the cleanup will be more expensive
than anticipated.' Therefore, the price the subsequent purchaser
will pay for the contaminated property will equal the fair market
value of the property after cleanup, less the estimated costs of
cleanup, less an additional premium.
For example, suppose a current owner acquires a small parcel
of land for $50,000 on which he or she plans to open a
minimarket. Suppose further that before the acquisition the parcel
was the former site of a gasoline station and that petroleum prod-
ucts leaked into the soil and onto a neighboring parcel. Assuming
that the current owner had no reason to know that the property
was contaminated at the time of purchase, the current owner is an
innocent landowner under sections 9601(35)(A) and 9607(b)(3).
Assume that, after title is transferred to this innocent landowner,
the neighboring landowner discovers contamination leaching from
the parcel and notifies the innocent landowner of the problem.
Further investigation reveals that it will cost approximately
$30,000 to clean up the property. If the innocent landowner has
no available resources to undertake a cleanup effort, or to pursue
a litigation option, or to fund a defense to establish its status as an
" A typical example of the potential harm subsequent purchasers can suffer when
actual cleanup costs exceed estimated cleanup costs is illustrated by Schurgin Development
Corporation's experience when it acquired the Franciscan Prominade in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. The Franciscan Prominade was the former site of a ceramics manufacturing plant.
Before acquiring the site, Schurgin hired an environmental consultant. The consultant
found piles of asbestos on the property along with unacceptable levels of lead and zinc in
the soil. The consultant estimated the costs of cleanup to be approximately $3 million.
Schurgin negotiated a purchase price reflecting the anticipated cleanup cost and acquired
the site. The consultant had estimated the cleanup cost based on a new remediation tech-
nique called "waste washing." This process turned out to be an unacceptable method of
treatment. Instead of cleansing the soil through waste washing, Schurgin was forced to seal
the hazardous materials in layers of concrete and asphalt, a process called "capping." The
cleanup costs ultimately exceeded $23 million. In addition to increasing the costs of
cleanup, the capping ultimately decreased the fair market value of the property. See Lori
Grange, Building a Franciscan Mall Called a Long Shot Development: Because the $23
Million Toxic Cleanup at the Site Costs More Than Expected, the Builder Faces Foreclo-
sure and the City Faces Loss of Funds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1990, at JI; Denise Hamil-
ton, Toxic Waste Cleanup at Atwater Will Begin Soon, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1987, § 9, at
1; Denise Hamilton, $60 Million Shopping Center Proposed for Franciscan Site, LA.
TIMES, June I, 1986, § 9, at 1; Martha L. Willman, $23 Million Cleanup Ends at Francis-
can Site, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at Jl.
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innocent landowner, the innocent landowner will have to sell the
property and recoup whatever value remains.
Although the innocent landowner will be able to avoid all of
the costs associated with the litigation option by selling the prop-
erty,1" the innocent landowner is duty-bound to disclose his or her
knowledge of the contamination to a subsequent purchaser, which
means that the subsequent purchaser will not qualify for the inno-
cent landowner defense once title is transferred, and will be jointly
and severally liable for the estimated $30,000 cleanup costs. Con-
sequently, the price a subsequent purchaser will pay for the prop-
erty will be discounted accordingly.
In a perfect world, a subsequent purchaser should not dis-
count the purchase price by the estimated costs of cleanup be-
cause the subsequent purchaser should be able to recoup the
cleanup costs from other responsible parties. However, the subse-
quent purchaser will certainly not want to take the risk that there
will be no solvent, responsible parties available to make a contri-
bution. Additionally, the subsequent purchaser will be unwilling to
take the risk that the actual cleanup costs will exceed the esti-
mated $30,000. Consequently, the subsequent purchaser will dis-
count the purchase price by $30,000, plus an additional amount as
compensation for the additional risks.
In this hypothetical, suppose a subsequent purchaser will of-
fer $10,000 for a parcel that will be worth $50,000 once $30,000
for cleanup is expended. The innocent landowner who does not
have the resources to clean up the contaminated property or to
pursue a litigation option must take a $40,000 loss on property
that he or she purchased for $50,000. Although these numbers are
fabricated, it is clear that the supposedly innocent landowner re-
ceives little economic benefit from the innocent landowner defense
because of his or her inability to transfer the innocent landowner
status to a subsequent purchaser.
The only real economic benefit innocent landowners receive
from their defense occurs when the estimated cleanup costs exceed
the value of the cleaned property. For example, suppose that in
the above hypothetical the estimated cleanup costs for the con-
taminated property were $75,000. The innocent landowner in such
a scenario would receive a real economic benefit from the defense
worth $25,000, less the costs of establishing his or her status as an
" See sources cited supra note 16.
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innocent landowner. The innocent landowner will not be able to
sell the property to a subsequent purchaser, but his or her liability
is capped at the value of the property plus the costs of establishing
the defense. No one can sue the innocent landowner for the
cleanup costs after the innocent landowner establishes the ele-
ments of sections 9601(35)(A) and 9607(b)(3). If the property is
cleaned up in the future, either by a responsible party or the gov-
ernment, the innocent landowner will then be able to market it
and recoup some economic benefit. Until that date, however, the
property will have a negative value, precluding the innocent land-
owner from selling it on the market.
CONCLUSION
There is no good reason to preclude subsequent purchasers of
contaminated property having knowledge of the contamination
from qualifying for the innocent landowner defense. If such trans-
fers of the defense were allowed, the pool of responsible parties
existing immediately prior to the transfer of title would be identi-
cal to the pool of responsible parties existing immediately after
the transfer. No responsible parties would be relieved from liabil-
ity by a transfer of contaminated property from an innocent land-
owner, who is by definition not responsible, to a subsequent pur-
chaser who has knowledge of the contamination. Modifying the
innocent landowner defense as suggested in this article would not
relieve any potentially responsible parties from liability. In fact,
allowing the transfer of status would probably result in faster
remediations and more thorough cleanup efforts.
Innocent landowners who do not have the resources to file
lawsuits against potentially responsible parties will theoretically
delay a cleanup effort. A subsequent purchaser with greater re-
sources who desires to clean up a parcel and use it for a more
efficient purpose should be able to do so with the same protection
against liability available to the innocent landowner who sold the
property. These subsequent purchasers will speed remediations by
filing lawsuits against responsible parties and forcing them to
clean up the contaminated property. Alternatively, these subse-
quent purchasers may elect to clean up the property first, putting
the property to a higher use at even an earlier date, and then sue
the responsible parties for contribution. In either event, a subse-
quent purchaser who could qualify for innocent landowner status
despite the fact that he or she acquired the property with knowl-
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edge of the contamination could accelerate the remediation pro-
cess. Nothing would be lost by allowing these subsequent purchas-
ers to qualify as innocent landowners, and there is potentially
much to gain.

